The traditional axiomatic approach to voting is motivated by the problem of reconciling differences in subjective preferences. In contrast, a dominant line of work in the theory of voting over the past 15 years has considered a different kind of scenario, also fundamental to voting, in which there is a genuinely "best" outcome that voters would agree on if they only had enough information. This type of scenario has its roots in the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem; it includes cases such as jurors in a criminal trial who all want to reach the correct verdict but disagree in their inferences from the available evidence, or a corporate board of directors who all want to improve the company's revenue, but who have different information that favors different options.
Introduction
Information-Based Voting. A dominant recent theme in the study of voting has been to trace differences in voters' preferences back to differences in the information they have about the world. This informationbased approach has its roots in one of the earliest results in voting theory -the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which used the then-young theory of probability to model a situation in which a panel of jurors each wants to vote for the correct decision in a trial, but each juror may be wrong about what the correct decision is independently and with probability p < the one supported by their signal. The bound achieved by our algorithm is tight: there are instances in which Ω(n 3 ǫ −2 log η −1 ) voters are necessary to achieve such a guarantee; this lower bound applies even to asymmetric strategies in which different voters can use different rules.
Note that by the pigeonhole principle, the minimum difference ǫ is at most 1/(n − 1), and hence ǫ −1 is a parameter that is at least as large as n − 1. For example, the special case with urns A 0 , A 1 , . . . , A n , in which A i contains i blue marbles and n − i red marbles, has ǫ = 1/n, and so for this problem the tight bound on the minimum number of voters needed is Θ(n 5 log η −1 ).
A recurring theme in our results is this fifth-power dependence of the number of voters on n, in the case when ǫ −1 is close to n. As such, it is useful to provide some intuition at the outset for how this fifth-power dependence arises. Thus, the following description is deliberately informal, but gives a sense for where this functional form comes from. Let there be m voters, and for simplicity let us consider the special case from the previous paragraph, with urns A 0 , A 1 , . . . , A n , in which A i contains i blue marbles and n − i red marbles. Under the asymptotically optimal (randomized) algorithms we consider, the correct urn will receive a greater number of votes in expectation than any other urn; this is why, with enough voters, we will eventually be able to distinguish the correct urn using plurality voting. Now, we will find that the optimal algorithm has the following two properties. First, it spreads out the votes relatively uniformly across a set of Θ(n) urns, and so if there are m voters, each of the urns in this set receives Θ(m/n) votes in expectation. The second, subtler property is the crucial one: the optimal algorithm ensures that the correct urn receives the most votes in expectation using a delicate optimization under which the the expected number of votes received by the correct urn will exceed the expected number of votes received by the adjacent urns by a factor of only 1 + δ, where δ = Θ(n −2 ). As a result, to distinguish the correct urn with high probability, we need a number of samples that is sufficient to yield at least Θ(δ −2 ) = Θ(n 4 ) votes for the correct urn. But since the correct urn receives only Θ(m/n) votes in expectation, this means that we need m to be Θ(n 5 ).
We observe that in our more general bound O(n 3 ǫ −2 log η −1 ), the form of the dependence on ǫ −1 is in fact necessary even if the voters could share their signals (rather than casting individual votes). Indeed, with n = 2 options that assign probabilities to signals differing by only ǫ, even a single observer would need to see Θ(ǫ −2 log η −1 ) signals in order to identify the correct option with probability at least 1 − η. Thus, with a constant number of options, plurality voting is allowing voters to aggregate their information with an efficiency that is within a constant factor of the efficiency achievable by a single person who could observe all signals directly.
For the case of C > 2 possible signals or colors, let ǫ denote the minimum ℓ 1 distance 1 of two distinct urns' probability distributions. We have an upper bound of O (C log C) 2 n 3 ǫ −2 log n η on the number of voters needed. Since the lower bound for the two-signal case applies with C > 2, it is tight in ǫ, and we lose only an exponentially small factor in n. Finding the correct dependence of the required number of voters on n and C is an interesting open question.
Under plurality voting, voters can only communicate the name of a single option in response to a signal. We also consider voting systems that allow voters to be much more expressive: cumulative voting, in which each vote consists of assigning a non-negative weight to each option (such that the weights sum to 1); and Condorcet voting, in which each vote consists of a ranking of all the options. For bichromatic urns, we show that cumulative voting requires only O(ǫ −2 log η −1 ) voters in order to succeed with high probability; this is tight even compared to the baseline discussed above, when a single observer has access to all the signals. We show that a similar bound would hold for Condorcet voting, modulo an intriguing conjecture about distributions over permutations.
Optimal Information-Based Voting: Main Techniques. The possibility result for identifying the correct option is based on a technique that implicitly draws a connection to the framework of proper scoring rules from statistics [11] . Proper scoring rules can be thought of as incentive systems for eliciting accurate probabilistic forecasts from expert predictors; the contexts in which they have been used in earlier work are quite different from ours, and to our knowledge there have not been previous linkages between proper scoring rules and information-based voting.
A construction based on proper scoring rules provides the first method for obtaining the correct option using plurality voting. However, we need to go beyond this construction in order to obtain a tight bound on the number of voters needed: in a sense to be made precise below, we can prove that any direct use of proper scoring rules in our setting requires at least Ω(nǫ −4 ) voters to achieve a high probability of success. This is at least Ω(n 3 ǫ −2 ) since ǫ ≤ (n − 1) −1 , and more significantly, it has an asymptotically sub-optimal dependence on ǫ of Ω(ǫ −4 ) when n is a constant, whereas our stronger approach achieves the optimal dependence of Θ(ǫ −2 log η −1 ) for constant n.
For the lower bound, we need to show that with O(n 3 ǫ −2 log η −1 ) voters, there is a probability η that plurality voting will choose the wrong option. For this, we identify a natural "close competitor" j of the correct option i, with a very similar signal distribution, and we consider a random variable that measures the extent to which the number of votes for the correct option i exceed the number for this competitor j. The (possibly asymmetric) strategies of the voters determine the variance of this random variable, and roughly speaking we follow a two-pronged argument in terms of this variance. If this variance is too low, then there is a high chance that voters would behave the same regardless of whether the option generating the signals was i or j, and hence that if they are correct about i with high probability, then they would have to be wrong with constant probability when j is the correct option. If the variance is above a certain low threshold, on the other hand, then we apply a carefully tuned "anti-concentration" inequality from [9, 14] showing that there is a constant probability that the number of votes for i will drop below the number for its competitor j.
Further Related Work. Finally, we mention two other recent lines of work that have also considered the problem faced by a set of agents trying to agree on a joint decision from a set of alternatives. Mossel, Sly, and Tamuz study a version of the problem in which there are two options, and each agent is given a probabilistic signal providing information about which option is correct [15] ; in contrast to our approach and to the work on voting discussed above, they consider a model in which agents may communicate iteratively over multiple rounds. Caragiannis and Procaccia consider a setting based on agents that possess utilities over options; within this framework, they show that simple voting rules can approximately optimize the sum of agents' utilities for the option that is selected [5] .
An Upper Bound with Two Signals
We begin by considering the case of two signals. Suppose we have a collection of n urns, labeled p 1 , . . . , p n , the i-th of which having a p i fraction of blue balls and a 1−p i fraction of red balls, with p 1 ≤ p 2 ≤ · · · ≤ p n . We let ǫ denote the smallest difference between two consecutive p i 's: ǫ = min 0≤i≤n−1 (p i+1 − p i ) .
We assume that one urn is adversarially chosen as the correct one (we will also refer to this as the unknown urn). Then each player draws a ball from the urn and votes for the name of an urn based on the color they observe.
We describe the strategy that the players will use to randomly choose which vote to cast:
and set M = max(R, B).
2. The probability that a voter will vote for p j if a red ball is drawn is
3. The probability that a voter will vote for p j if a blue ball is drawn is
It is easy to check that the two given distribution are indeed probability distributions (their values are non-negative and they both sum up to one). Now, the probability that a player will vote for p j given that the correct, adversarially chosen, distribution is p i , is
Now consider two urns, p i and p j . We compute the difference between the probabilities that a vote for urn p i and a vote for urn p j are cast, given that the correct urn is p i :
We will lower-bound ∆ i (j) to bound the number of voters needed to let the voting scheme be successful with high probability. Suppose first that j < i; then
observing that in each term of the sum we have
If, instead, i < j we have:
where the inequality follows from p i ≤ p ℓ . Therefore for j = i, we have
We now give an upper bound on the probability that the correct urn will be chosen by a voter. Note, somewhat counter-intuitively, that the probability of a correct vote is higher when this upper bound is smaller -this is because the ∆ i (j) are additive gaps, not multiplicative ones, and so by making the upper bound on the expected number of votes for the correct urn smaller, the gap ∆ i (j) becomes larger relative to the mean.
Recall that the correct urn is p i . We upper-bound the probability that a vote will go to p i :
Observe that, by the definition of ǫ, we have that
ǫ , and furthermore
We now give an upper bound on M . This will allow us to apply a Chernoff bound and finish the proof.
Recall that M = max(R, B); we will upper bound R + B to get an upper bound on M :
Therefore, going back to the probability that an urn identical to the correct urn is voted for, we have
Furthermore, since ∆ i (j) > 0 for each j = i, we have that the urn p i is the most likely urn to be voted for, and therefore E i (i) ≥ 1 n . We are now ready to state the main theorem of the section. Its proof employs a careful application of the Chernoff bound, and the inequalities we have derived in this section. Theorem 2.1. Let urns p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n be given, with urn p i having a p i fraction of blue balls, and a 1 − p i fraction of red balls. Let 0 ≤ p 1 < p 2 < · · · < p n ≤ 1. Also, let ǫ be ǫ = min 1≤i≤n−1 (p i+1 − p i ). Then, for Plurality Voting, O n 3 ǫ −2 ln η −1 voters are sufficient to guarantee a probability of at least 1 − η that the correct urn receives the most votes.
Proof. Observe that ǫ ≤ 1 n−1 . Choose some η ∈ (0, 1), and suppose the number of players is m = 108 ·
η -we will show that m players will be enough to choose the correct option with probability is at least 1 − η. Observe that, given our upper bound M ≤
Recall that we say that the players lose if an urn with a different distribution from the unknown urn wins the election. We will upper-bound the probability that the players lose, using the following form of the Chernoff bound: Theorem 2.2 (Chernoff bound). Let X 1 , . . . , X m be independent 0/1 random variables with expectation
and,
We now show how to use Theorem 2.2, together with the bounds derived in Section 5.1, to prove Theorem 2.1. Let V j be the number of votes to p j in the random election, with unknown urn i. Then, 
and
,
It follows that if m = Θ(n 3 ǫ −2 log η −1 ), and voters apply the aforementioned voting scheme, the probability of winning is at least 1 − η.
A Connection to Proper Scoring Rules
In this section we discuss the connection between our upper bound and the notion of a proper scoring rule [11] . We first show how to obtain a strategy for a set of voters in the two-signal case using proper scoring rules. 2 We then show that basing a strategy on proper scoring rules cannot lead to an asymptotically tight result: any voting strategy based on the functions arising from the framework of proper scoring rules requires at least Ω nǫ −4 voters. This is weaker than the upper bound of O(n 3 ǫ −2 log η −1 ) that we obtained in Section 2 in two important respects. First, by the pigeon-hole principle, ǫ ≤ 1 n−1 , and therefore approach from the previous section is always at least as good as the approach based on proper scoring rules, and often much better. More significantly, when n is a constant, the approach via scoring rules gives a dependence on ǫ of O(ǫ −4 ), whereas our approach from Section 2 gives O(ǫ −2 ), which is optimal even if the group of voters could directly share all their signals. (In other words, even if there were just a single voter who received all the signals.)
For our purposes in this discussion, it is not necessary to introduce the full theory of proper scoring rules, but just to provide a self-contained consequence of that theory. The consequence is the following: it is possible to construct pairs of non-negative functions (f 0 , f 1 ), each defined over the interval [0, 1], with the property that for all z ∈ [0, 1], the function
is uniquely maximized at x = z. We will further assume that f 0 and f 1 each have continuous second derivatives, which is true of the standard functions that arise from this theory. This defining property of f 0 and f 1 is all we will need. From a pair of such functions, here is how we can define a strategy for each voter in the two-signal case. We have a set of n + 1 urns, where urn i has a probability p i of producing a blue ball. We define q 0 = i f 0 (p i ) and q 1 = i f 1 (p i ), and let q * = max(q 1 , q 0 ). Now, when a voter draws a blue ball, they vote for urn i with probability proportional to
; if they draw a red ball, they vote for urn i with probability proportional to
. We call this the strategy induced by f 0 and f 1 .
Suppose the true urn is t; then the number of votes for an urn j is a random variable X j = v X jv , where X jv is the indicator variable that voter v votes for j. With k voters, we have
By the defining property of f 0 and f 1 , we see that E [X j ] is uniquely maximized at j = t. Hence for a sufficiently large set of voters, the number of votes received by urn t will exceed the number received by all other urns with high probability. Thus, the strategy induced by any proper scoring rule will produce the true urn with high probability when there are enough voters. It can be viewed, in a sense, as a much simpler version of the construction in Section 2, and we now show that this simpler approach results in asymptotically larger number of voters. Proof. We start with a basic claim about sums of Bernoulli trials. Let X = k i 1 X i be a sum of independent 0-1 random variables, where
Then with constant probability, X will deviate by at least a constant multiple of √ Var X from µ. More concretely, there are absolute constants α > 0 and β > 0 so that with probability at least α, we have
we have
Now, for a given δ > 0, suppose we have µ < β 2 /(2δ 2 ). Then equivalently, δ < β/ √ 2µ, so
Hence with probability at least α > 0, we have X < (1−δ)µ. It follows that in order to ensure X ≥ (1−δ)µ with probability going to 1, we must have µ ≥ Ω(1/δ 2 ). Now, recall that there are k voters, and consider the voting strategy induced by the functions f 0 and f 1 . Since the first derivatives f ′ 0 and f ′ 1 are continuous functions defined over the compact set
Using the bound on the first derivative, for any γ > 0 we can find an interval
It follows that if our probabilities p 0 , p 1 , . . . , p n all lie in this interval [u, v] , then
for a constant γ 1 that goes to 0 with γ. Also, we have q * ≥ dn. Now, for any ǫ > 0, we choose
Let t be the true urn, and let
Since h(x) has its global maximum at
Writing p t+1 − p t = ǫ, we have
Now, using our initial fact about sums of Bernoulli trials, we must have
A Tight Lower Bound for Two Signals
In this section we give a tight lower bound that confirms the optimality of the voting scheme for two signals presented in Section 2. We will start by introducing a class of instances. We will then prove a combinatorial lemma on how certain parameters of any (asymmetric) voting system for these instances have to behave, and we use the lemma to prove the lower bound.
We start by defining the lower bound class of instances I(n, ǫ), for any n ≥ 2 and ǫ
Each voter t is defined by two probability distributions (R 1,t , R 2,t , . . . , R n,t ), (B 1,t , B 2,t , . . . , B n,t ): if she draws a red (resp., blue) ball she will vote for urn i with probability R i,t (resp., B i,t ).
Given a voting scheme for m voters (that is, 2m probability vectors (R i,t ), (B i,t )), we define
Thus the expected number of votes E i (j) to urn j, if i is the correct urn, will be equal to m
to be the expected difference between the number of votes to i and j, if i is the correct urn, averaged over the m voters.
We say that a voting scheme is proper if ∆ i (j) ≥ 0, for each i, j. The challenge in proving the lower bound lies in the fact that proper voting schemes can succeed in identifying the correct urn for what seem to be a variety of different reasons, and so we need to find a common property they have which implies that the correct urn only "narrowly" wins the election over other urns with very similar distributions. This is the content of the following lemma. 
n , for i = 1, . . . , n. (c) There exists a set S ⊆ [n] and ι ∈ {−1, +1}, with |S| ≥ n 4 − 3 ln n − 14, such that for each i ∈ S, we have
, and
The crux of the lemma is to show that for many pairs of urns i, i + ι, the election will be very "close": if i is the correct urn, it does not win the election by a large margin over i + ι in expectation (and vice versa). The lemma shows further that, averaged over the voters, the difference between the probability of voting for i given a red (resp., blue) ball and the probability of voting for i + ι given the same color is small. This upper bound is crucial for the proof of the lower-bound theorem, stated next: we will show that -even if we only cared about urns i, i + ι -the variance of a voter's choice can be lower-bounded by Ω(|R i,t − B i,t |). This, assuming that the total variance is at least some constant, will allow us to apply an anti-concentration inequality to show that the expected margin ∆ i (i + ι) of urn i over urn i + ι will be surpassed by Θ ln η −1 standard deviations of the number of votes to urn i and i+ ι. It will follow that with probability Ω(η) the election will be won by the wrong urn. Again, this argument requires that the variance be at least some sufficiently large constant; if the variance is actually smaller than this constant, we will use a different argument showing that the voting system is sufficiently "inflexible" that if urn i wins when it is correct, the same pattern of votes is likely to also arise -favoring i -when i + ι is actually correct.
Proof. We will first show that in a proper voting scheme, for each i < j it holds that B i ≤ B j and
contradicting the properness of the voting scheme;
• the same argument gives a contradiction if B i > B j and R i > R j (choosing k = j);
which is impossible since the left-hand side is positive by B i > B j and R j > R i .
It follows that B i ≤ B j and R i ≥ R j . We now show that B n ≤ 9 n (resp.,
2 ), it follows that there exists some i such that
n . Let k r be the largest integer such that R kr+1 ≥ B kr+1 , and k b be the largest integer such that
By (c) at least one of k r and k b has to be at least n 2 − 1. We let S R and S B be
. . , n − 1, n}. We consider two cases:
• suppose k r ≥ n 2 − 1. We relabel the element in S R = [k r ] − S R , using r = S R :
We now upper bound L(k) to get an upper bound on r = S R :
It follows that r = S R < L (⌈11 + 3 ln n⌉) ≤ n 4 + ⌈11 + 3 ln n⌉ + 1 ≤ n 4 + 3 ln n + 13, and therefore
• Otherwise, k r < n 2 − 1 and therefore k b > n 2 − 1. A proof similar to the previous case gives
Therefore, at least one of S R and S R has cardinality at least n 4 − 3 ln n − 14. If S R is the largest one we pick ι = 1 and S = S R . Otherwise, we pick ι = −1 and S = S B . Observe that the choice satisfies the first requirement of point (c) in the statement.
We now prove the second requirement of point (c). Let i be an element of S, β = B i − B i+ι , and ρ = R i − R i+ι . Then, |β| = −ιβ and |ρ| = ιρ. Also,
. By the properness of the voting system, we would have:
, by the definition of the instance, we have that p i+ι − p i = ι · ǫ, therefore we would have
which would imply that at least one of |β| and |ρ| is larger than e
, a contradiction. It follows that both ∆ i (i + ι) and ∆ i+ι (i) are less than or equal
Theorem 4.2. There exists a positive constant H such that for any η < H, one has that any voting scheme for I(n, ǫ), with n ≥ 120 and ǫ ≤ 1 11(n−1) using at most O n 3 ǫ 2 log 1 η voters will fail to win the election with probability Ω(η).
Proof. Take any asymmetric voting scheme for I(n, ǫ) with m voters -that is, a sequence of m vectors (R 1,t , . . . , R n,t ) and (B 1,t , . . . , B n,t ), for 1 ≤ t ≤ m, such that the probability that the tth voter votes for the ith urn if she draws a blue (resp., red) ball is B i,t (resp., R i,t ).
If the voting scheme is improper, then by definition there exists i, j such that ∆ i (j) < 0. Otherwise, by n ≥ 120, one has n 4 − 3 ln n − 14 ≥ 1, and by Lemma 4.1, there will exist two urns i and j ∈ {i − 1,
.
Given i, j, we define the head-to-head (i, j)-voting process as follows; for each voter t, the random variable X t = X t (i, j) will be defined as
1 if voter t votes for urn j, given that the unknown urn is i, 1 /2 if voter t does not vote for urns i or j, given that the unknown urn is i, 0 if voter t votes for the unknown urn i.
Observe that X = m t=1 X t ≥ m 2 iff the number of votes to urn j is not smaller than the number of votes to the right urn i. In this case, the voters will lose the election. Furthermore,
Since X is the sum of independent random variables, we have that
11 . We will use that
for each i, to lower-bound the variance of X t :
We consider two cases:
•
The latter is equal to both
we can therefore get a lower bound of
If, on the other hand, B i > R i , we have
Therefore, in any case, we have
We now give a different lower bound on Var [X] , that we will use to deal with the case of very small variance Var [X] . Let p 1,t , p1 /2,t , p 0,t be, respectively, the probabilities that X t = 1, X t = 1 2 and X t = 0. Then, E[X t ] = p 1,t + 1 2 · p1 /2,t , and
We consider three cases:
• If p 0,t = max p 1,t , p1 /2,t , p 0,t ≥ 
• If p1 /2,t = max p 1,t , p1 /2,t , p 0,t ≥ 1 3 , then
In each of the three cases, we had
, and therefore
Let us now assume that Var[X] ≤ Recall that X = X(i, j) ≥ m 2 iff the unknown urn i gets at most as many votes as j (and therefore the election is lost). In the following we will also consider X ′ = X(j, i); we have that X ′ ≤ m 2 iff urn i gets at least as many votes as the unknown urn j (this also implies that the election is lost).
Observe that, since
, no matter what the unknown urn is, the probability that any specific voter votes for any specific urn changes by a constant factor (between We now show that, given that Var[x] ≤ 1 72 · log 5 η −1 , then with probability at least η /9 each voter will vote according to its maximum probability choice: that is Pr[∀t, X t equals the value x t that maximizes Pr[
If these choices let an urn different from i win the election, we have proven the theorem. Otherwise, we show that -if we exchange the unknown urn with any other urn k -then still with probability at least η /25 each voter t will vote for the same urn x t ; implying either a tie at the top, or that i (which would then not be the correct urn anymore) would will the election. We let s t denote the sum of the two minimum probabilities in {p 1,t , p1 /2,t , p 0,t }; that is s
We now lower-bound the product, using the following greedy algorithm: take one of the largest s t ′ < 2 3 , and one of the smallest s t > 0, with s t = s t ′ . Then move x = min 2 3 − s t ′ , s t > 0 mass from s t to s t ′ . Observe that the sum s of the s t 's remains constant throughout the process; furthermore the product t m=1 s t decreases: indeed, consider the product of s t · s t ′ before and after the change -we can disregard the rest since it remains constant. Let s t , s t ′ be the two values before the change, and s t − x, s t ′ + x be the two values after the change. That product used to be s t · s t ′ , and becomes s t · s t ′ − x(s t ′ − s t ) − x 2 -the latter is smaller than s t · s t ′ since x > 0 and s t ′ > s t . Note also that at each step one of the s t 's stops being considered (either because it becomes equal to 2 3 or equal to 0) -therefore the algorithm terminates. At termination there will exist at most one s t with value different from , and all the others having null value. Given that s ≤ 2 3 log 5 η −1 , we can then minimize the former probability with Pr[∀t, X t equals the value x t that maximizes Pr[
If these sequence of votes guarantees that the unknown urn i loses the election, we are done. Otherwise, we exchange the roles of urns i and j. 
Using the same greedy algorithm as before, but moving mass x = min 
Now, if urn i won with this sequence of votes, it follows that j cannot win.
We have shown that if Var[X] ≤ 1 72 log 5 η −1 , then the probability of winning is at most 1 − η 25 . We now assume Var[X] > 1 72 log 5 η −1 . We will use the following anti-concentration inequality (see Theorem 7.3.1 in [14] , and [9] ) to finish the proof: 
, it holds that
for some universal constant c > 0.
We apply Theorem 4.3 on the random variable X = X(i, j), choosing t =
, if ∆ i (j) ≥ 0, and t = 0 otherwise. This choice is valid since
where the latter holds if m ≤ 
. We show that the event "X ≥ E[X] + t" implies the event "X ≥ m 2 " (which directly implies that the unknown urn i will not win the election). If ∆ i (j) < 0, the claim is trivial, since then E[X] > m 2 , and t is non-negative. Otherwise, by the bound
, we get
The proof is then complete.
An Upper Bound for Many Signals
In this section we consider the voting problem in its full generality: we have a set of n ≥ 2 urns, with each urn i = 1, . . . , n inducing a distinct probability distribution P i = (p i,1 , p i,2 , . . . , p i,C ) over a set of C signals or colors. Let ǫ be the minimum ℓ 1 distance between the distributions P i :
Observe that when C = 2, this parameter ǫ is twice the one that we used in Section 2.
Theorem 5.1. There exists a voting scheme that, using m = Θ
(C log C) 2 n 3 ǫ 2 ln n η voters, guarantee that the unknown urn wins with probability at least 1 − η.
The proof of this Theorem spans two subsections (Sections 5.1 and 5.2). In Section 5.1 we generalize the bichromatic voting scheme so (a) to treat urns that are not "well-separated" as if they were the samethis virtually increases the separation parameter ǫ -and (b) to guarantee, under some conditions, that the equivalent of the M parameter of the bichromatic voting scheme of Section 2 is not just upper bounded by O(n 2 ǫ −1 ), but is actually asymptotic to Θ(n 2 ǫ −1 ).
In Section 5.2, we use both these properties to devise a new voting scheme that uses the generalized bichromatic one as a black box. The main idea of the multicolor voting scheme is to force voters to view the urns as bichromatic ones: each voter will choose a color c at random, and consider each urn as a bichromatic urn with colors c,c -that is, she will imagine that there are only two colors: "c" and "any color other than c". Using this trick directly with the bichromatic voting scheme of section 2 would decrease to 0 the minimum distance between urns in the worst case. We do not want the separation between urns to decrease -since that would increase the minimum number of voters needed for the election to be successful -this is where property (a) of the generalized bichromatic voting scheme becomes pivotal. Also, we need a way to aggregate the votes given to each single urn, in each of the (c,c) bichromatic instances; this has to be done in a way that guarantees that the right urn will win with high probability. We manage to do this by leveraging on property (b).
A More Flexible Upper Bound with Two Signals
To build a framework that can be used to handle the case of C > 2 signals, it is useful to consider a more general formulation of the bichromatic problem in which certain options can induce identical distributions over signals (and hence be indistinguishable from each other). We present the analysis in the language of urns and colored balls.
Thus, suppose we have a collection of n urns, labeled p i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. With a slight abuse of notation we let p i and 1 − p i be, respectively, the fraction of blue balls, and of red balls, in urn p i . We assume w.
We assume that one urn is adversarially chosen as the correct one (we will also refer to this as the unknown urn). Then each player draws a ball from the urn and votes for the name of an urn based on the color they observe. For this general version with indistinguishable urns, we will be interested in the probability that the urn receiving the most votes has the same distribution as the correct one; this general formulation is for the sake of the multi-color case later.
We describe the strategy that the players will use to randomly choose which vote to cast. First of all, for some n ′ ≥ 10,
i 's are called the landmarks of the voting scheme.
Let b
2. Let φ : {p 1 , . . . , p n } → {1, . . . , n ′ } be a mapping from urns to landmarks' indices, defined so that φ(p i ) = k if k maximizes p i b k + (1 − p i )r k (ties can be broken arbitrarily).
Then define
φ −1 (k) + 1 · b k , and set M = max(R, B).
The probability that a voter will vote for p j if a blue ball is drawn is
5. The probability that a voter will vote for p j if a red ball is drawn is
It is easy to check that the two probability distributions (B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n ) and (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n ) are well-defined (their values are non-negative and they both sum up to one). Observe that B i = B j and 
Proof. For an arbitrary k it holds that
The latter sum does not depend on k. Therefore p i b k + (1 − p i )r k is maximized with a k that maximizes the total of the former two sums. Suppose that k − i exists and that k < k − i maximizes the expression; then, by increasing k to k + 1 ≤ k − i , we would remove the term
from the second sum, and add the term 
from the first sum, and add the term
to the second one.
we obtain that 2p i < p ′ k−1 + p ′ k and therefore we increase the total value of the first two sums; thus k > k + i does not maximize the expression.
We now turn to computing the probability that a player will vote for p j given that the correct, adversarially chosen, distribution is p i :
We compute the difference between the probabilities that a vote for urn p i and a vote for urn p j are cast, given that the correct urn is p i :
We will lower-bound ∆ i (j) to bound the number of voters needed to let the voting scheme be successful with high probability.
Lemma 5.3. For each 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, it holds that
We make the expression of ∆ i (j) explicit:
Suppose first that φ(p j ) < k
where the first inequality follows from φ(p i ) ≥ k − i and the second from
where the first inequality follows from φ(p i ) ≤ k + i and the second from
we have that ∆ i (j) ≥ 0 for each ordered couple of urns i, j. The statement follows.
Lemma 5.4. It holds that
Proof. Recall that the correct urn is p i . We upper-bound the probability that a vote will actually go to p i :
We now give an upper bound on M . This will allow us to apply a Chernoff bound and prove the main theorem.
Lemma 5.5. It holds that
Proof. Recall that M = max(R, B); we will upper bound R + B to get an upper bound on M :
We now move on to the lower bound. Recall that n ′ ≥ 10, and that, for each k = 1, 2, . . . ,
n ′ −1 , and
We are now ready to lower bound M :
using the upper bound we previously obtained for (2K + 1)ǫ, we obtain:
observe that (n ′ − k) + (k − 1) = n ′ − 1 and therefore at least one of (n ′ − k) and k − 1 is at least
An Upper Bound for Many Signals
In this section we consider the voting problem in its full generality: we have a set of n ≥ 2 urns, with each urn i = 1, . . . , n inducing a distinct probability distribution P i = (p i,1 , p i,2 , . . . , p i,C ) over a set of C colors. Let ǫ be the minimum ℓ 1 distance between the distributions P i :
It turns out that the bichromatic scheme from Section 5.1 has already laid much of the groundwork for the multi-color case. Each voter u will behave as follows:
1. First, u will choose a color c = c(u) uniformly at random from among all the colors. Voter u will then imagine the urns as inducing a bichromatic instance by imagining all colors other than c as a single colorc. In this way, urn i becomes a bichromatic urn with distribution (p i,c , 1 − p i,c ) over its two colors.
2. Then, voter u will choose an integer t = t(u) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T } with T = ⌈log 3 C⌉ + 1, in such a way that
3. Voter u will then apply the bichromatic voting scheme from Section 5.1 to choose which urn to vote for. She will set {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n } = {p 1,c , p 2,c , . . . , p n,c }, for i = 1, . . . , n; the sequence of the p ′ i 's will be defined as follows:
-first she will pick a subsequence according to the following marking algorithm: set w 1 = 0 and mark all the p j 's such that p j ≤ 3 −t · ǫ; if some unmarked p j remains, let i = 2, and -set w i to be the smallest unmarked p j ,
-mark all the p j 's for which |p j − w i | < 3 −t · ǫ;
-if some unmarked p j remains, repeat; otherwise, if w i = 1, set w i+1 = 1; then, stop.
4. let i * be the length of the sequence {w i }; if i * < 10, the voter will add 10 − i * elements to {w i }: let i be such that w i+1 − w i is maximized; the voter will insert the values the values
The size of the sequence {w i } will then be at least 10.
The voter will then define the sequences
5. the voter then merges the sequences w i , x i,1 , x i,2 , and sorts the resulting sequence increasingly; let y 1 < y 2 < · · · < y 3i * −2 be this sequence, and ǫ c,t be its separation parameter: ǫ c,t = min i=1,...,3i * −3 y i+1 − y i .
6. then the voter adds elements to {y i } in such a way that:
(a) the minimum separation between adjacent elements remains at least ǫ c,t , (b) if the list has length n ′ , then for each i = 1, . . . , , . . . , n ′ − 1, it holds that y i+1 − y i ≤ 2ǫ c,t .
To do so, she applies the following algorithm:
6.1 if (b) is not satisfied, i.e., if the list {y i } has currently length n ′ and i is a minimal index i for which there exists elements y i , y i+1 such that i ≤ n ′ 3 and y i+1 − y i > 2ǫ c,t , then insert a new element between y i and y i+1 of value y i + ǫ c,t ; this will increase the length of the list; repeat this step as long as (b) is not satisfied; 6.2 if (c) is not satisfied, i.e., if the list {y i } has currently length n ′ and there is a maximal index i for which there exists elements y i , y i+1 such that i ≥ 2n ′ 3 and y i+1 − y i > 2ǫ c,t , then insert a new element between y i and y i+1 of value y i+1 − ǫ c,t ; repeat this step as long as (c) is not satisfied.
It is easy to prove that the above algorithm guarantees properties (a), (b) and (c). Let n ′ c,t be the length of the final sequence {y i }, K c,t = n ′ c,t
3
, and observe that the algorithm also guarantees that (d) n ′ c,t ≥ 10, (e) n ′ c,t ≤ 3i * − 2 + 2(K c,t + 1) ≤ 9i * + 2 ≤ 9n + 2 and (f) y Kc,t+1 ≤ (2K c,t + 1)ǫ c,t and y n ′ c,t −Kc,t ≥ 1 − (2K c,t + 1)ǫ c,t . The just-defined bichromatic instance depends only on the original multi-colored instance, on c and on t -we use (c, t)-instance to refer to the bichromatic instance induced by c and t.
Observe that the separation parameter ǫ c,t of the (c, t)-instance will be at least ǫ c,t ≥ 3 −t−3 · ǫ, since the w i 's are at distance of at least 3 −t−2 · ǫ from each other 3 , and x i,1 , x i,2 split the interval between w i and w i+1 in three equal parts -the subsequently added y i 's do not induce gaps smaller that ǫ c,t . Furthermore the number of landmarks of the (c, t)-instance will be 10 ≤ n ′ c,t ≤ 9n + 2 ≤ 10n, since n ≥ 2. We are now ready to prove Theorem 5.1, using the machinery built in Section 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. First, given two urns P i , P j , we say that a color c is useful
Observe that if C i,j is the set of useful colors for urns P i , P j , we have
Indeed, since there are only C colors, the contribution to the ℓ 1 distance between P i and P j of their nonuseful colors is less than C · ǫ 3C = ǫ 3 . Given that the total distance is at least ǫ, it follows that the useful colors contribute by more than 2ǫ 3 to the ℓ 1 distance of P i , P j . Suppose that i is the unknown urn. Let p i = p i,c and p j = p j,c in the (c, t)-bichromatic instance, for some c, t. Let E (c,t) i (j) be the expected number of votes that a voter will give to urn j, if i is the unknown urn, in the (c, t)-bichromatic instance. The analysis of the bichromatic case, guarantees that
and that the difference ∆
Fix a color c ∈ C i,j and let t c,i,j be the smallest non-negative integer such that
Since c is a useful color we have |p i,c − p j,c | > ǫ 3C , and therefore 0 ≤ t c,i,j ≤ ⌈log 3 C⌉ + 1 = T . By ǫ c,t ≥ 3 −t−3 · ǫ, we obtain
Since |p i − p j | ≥ ǫ · 3 −t c,i,j , the marking algorithm run by the voters will mark p i and p j at different iterations -therefore, there are at least three landmarks between p i and p j . It follows that |φ(
Then,
ln n η as the number of voters, and we apply Chernoff bound (see Theorem 2.2), on V j : the number of votes to urn j in the election, if i is the unknown urn. Observe that E[V j ] = m · E i (j), and furthermore:
Applying the Union Bound over all the urns, we have that each single urn j will deviate by at most x 3 m from its expected number of votes with probability at least 1 − η, and since the expected difference of the number of votes of urn i and j if i is the unknown urn is at least m · ∆ i (j) ≥ m · x, we have that urn i will win the election with probability at least 1 − η.
Other Voting Systems
In this section we study other important voting systems, assuming that there are two types of signals; that is, assuming bichromatic urns.
Cumulative Voting
We show that cumulative voting requires a smaller number of voters for the election to succeed with high probability. In fact, cumulative voting can be exploited to work with a number of voters as small as the number of samples used by the optimal centralized algorithm (that is, the algorithm that, after sampling the minimum number of balls, produces the right guess with high probability).
Like plurality voting, in the cumulative voting election system, each voter has a single vote to cast; unlike plurality voting, though, the voter can split her vote arbitrarily between the candidates: Definition 6.1 (Cumulative Voting). Each voter assigns a score to each candidate, in such a way that no score is negative and the sum of the scores assigned by a voter is 1. The total score of a candidate is the sum of the scores assigned to that candidate by the voters. If there exists a candidate i having a total score larger than the total score of each other candidate j = i, then i is the winner of the election.
Given urns p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n , the voting scheme we propose for cumulative voting is directly derived from the plurality voting scheme we proposed earlier; in the new scheme, there are only two possible votes: if a voter picks a red (resp., blue) ball then she will vote (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n ) (resp., (B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n )) -that is, she will assign a weight of R i (resp., B i ) to candidate P i , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The R i 's and the B i 's are those that we defined for the plurality voting scheme. Proof. Choose some η ∈ (0, 1), and suppose the number of players is
We start by using the Chernoff bound to show that the number of voters that pick a ball of some color is concentrated. If p i ≥ 1 2 , let X be the number of voters picking a blue ball; otherwise let X be the number of voters picking a red ball. In both cases, X is the sum of iid binary random variables X j , with X j = 1 with probability max(p i , 1 − p i ) and X j = 0 with probability min(
that is, with probability 1 − η the absolute difference between the number m b of blue (resp., the number m r of red) balls picked and the expectation
be the fractional number of votes to P j in the random election, with unknown urn
Observe that urn i beats urn j in the election (with unknown urn i) iff D i (j) > 0. The random variable D i (j) is the sum of m iid random variables D ′ i (j) each taking value B i − B j if the corresponding voter picked a blue ball and R i − R j if she picked a red ball; we now bound the span S of values of
Analogously, |r i − r j | ≤ 2|i−j| ǫ . It follows that the span of D ′ i (j) can be upper bounded by
Observe that D i (j) is a linear function of the number m b of blue balls picked (and the number m r = m − m b of red balls picked):
where ∆ i (j) is the functional defined in Section 2; recall that we proved there that
If this event happens we have that, for each j = i,
Therefore, urn i will beat each urn j = i, with probability 1 − η. The proof is concluded.
Observe that the previous bound is tight in a strong sense: no algorithm that picks o ǫ −2 ln 1 η balls, and produces a guess arbitrarily after having seen all their colors, is able to guess the right urn with probability at least 1 − η.
Condorcet Voting
In this section we present a conjecture, and we elaborate on it, with the aim of showing that Condorcet voting is as good as Cumulative voting -and is thus optimal. We begin by recalling the definition of the Condorcet voting system: We observe that, in Condorcet voting, voters do not assign real numbers to candidates as in Cumulative voting -they rather return a discrete object: a permutation of them.
There exist many variants of the Condorcet election. The differences between them lie in the way of dealing with ties (that is, when no candidate i beats each other candidate j in a run-off election). Our main theorem holds for any such variant, since our theorem will guarantee that no ties will exist with high probability.
We start by defining a set of coefficients that will be useful for introducing a Condorcet voting scheme. 
We define inductively the sequence b k,ℓ , indexed by two integers; if k < 0 or ℓ < 0 then b k,ℓ = 0; for notational simplicity we will use:
The induction is well-defined: x k−1,ℓ only depends on the b i,j 's for which either (a) i + j ≤ k − 1, or (b) i ≤ k − 1 and j = ℓ; y k−1,ℓ only depends on the b i,j 's for which i ≤ k − 1 and j = ℓ. Therefore, the b k,ℓ 's can be computed in the following order via the recurrence: for n = 0, 1, 2, . . . and for k = 0, . . . , n, compute b k,n−k . We now make a conjecture on the b k,ℓ 's:
Comments on Conjecture 6.5. We now make some comments on the conjecture, indicating some possible approaches to settle it.
By looking at the first few terms of B 1 (x, P )'s Taylor expansion, it appears that B(x, P ) = B 1 (x, P ).
The B 1 (x, P ) expression, if B 1 (x, P ) = B(x, P ), could be quite useful to prove non-negativity, since the a k,ℓ 's seem all to be non-negative -if they are point (ii) of the conjecture directly follows.
where n k represents the unsigned Stirling number of the first kind with indices n ≥ k. The last claim can be proved using the B 1 (x, P ) expression and the following expression for (Q + 1) −t , t > 0:
if n is even
we have that the point (iii) of the conjecture states that, for n ≥ 0, Tables 1 and 2 show how the b k,ℓ and the a k,ℓ sequences begins.
We use Conjecture 6.5 to show the existence of a probability distribution over permutations that induces a given set of "marginals". Lemma 6.6. Let 0 ≤ p 1 < p 2 < · · · < p n ≤ 1. Then, if Conjecture 6.5 is true, there exists a probability distribution over the symmetric group S n , such that, for each 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n,
Proof. To each probability p ∈ [0, 1] we associate a random variable X p with values:
, X p is the constant random variable p, with a point mass γ p = 1 at p;
By Conjecture 6.5, we have that β p (x) ≥ 0 and
therefore the total probability mass assigned to X p is 1 -X p is then a well-defined random variable.
The CDF associated to α p (x), for p ≥ 
The CDF associated to β p (x), for p ≥ 1 2 and 1 2 ≤ y ≤ p is:
Observe that if p = q, then there's zero probability that X p = X q -since, for each p, X p has a positive point mass only at p. Then, we pick a permutation π of {1, 2, . . . , n} by letting π(i) < π(j) iff X p i < X p j .
We verify that the marginals Π i,j of our distribution satisfy the requirement in the claim:
• if
We now show that P 1 + P 2 + P 3 + P 4 = 1 p+q , completing the proof. We start by computing P 1 and P 2 :
As for P 3 and P 4 , we have:
We show that for our definition of B(x, P ) = β P + 1 /2 (x + 1 /2), the equation Pr [X p ≤ X q ] = P 1 + P 2 + P 3 + P 4 is equal to
The latter is true iff P 3 + P 4 = 1 p+q − P 1 − P 2 ; expanding the terms, we get the equation holds iff: (q − p) 2 − 2q − 1 (q − p)(2q + 1)
For notational convenience, we let P = p − (Q − P ) 2 − Q (Q + 1)(Q − P ) .
Since we will expand the right-hand side in a Taylor series around (Q, P ) = (0, 0), we observe that the right-hand side has a removable singularity at P = Q. Indeed, letting P = Q − ǫ, 
Also,
and, since
Furthermore, we have
observe that c k,ℓ = c 1 (k, ℓ) + c 2 (k, ℓ), where c k,ℓ is as in Definition 6.4. We then have that P 1 + P 2 + P 3 + P 4 = 1 p+q (particularly, Equation 7) is satisfied iff
The equality holds iff for each k, ℓ ≥ 0, we have we have that Equation 7 is satisfied and P 1 + P 2 + P 3 + P 4 = 1 p+q .
Using the previous distribution over permutations we can prove the main theorem of the section. Proof. Lemma 6.6 guarantees the existence of a probability distribution P over the set of permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n} such that, for each 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, Pr π∼P [π(i) < π(j)] = min 1,
. If π(j) > π(i) we say that j beats i in π.
We also let q i = 1 − p i ; therefore 0 ≤ q n < q n−1 < · · · < q 1 ≤ 1, and min 1≤i≤n−1 (q i+1 − q i ) = ǫ. Lemma 6.6 again guarantees the existence of a probability distribution Q over the set of permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n} such that for n ≥ i > j ≥ 1, we have Pr π∼Q [π(i) < π(j)] = min 1,
Each voter will apply the following algorithm: if she draws blue, she sample a permutation according to P , otherwise she samples a permutation according to Q. Now, given two urns i, j, let X i (j) be the random variable counting the number of votes in which i > j, with m voters. Observe that if X i (j) > m 2 , then urn i beats urn j. Also,
By choosing m = 150ǫ −2 ln 
